Does innovation policy policy matter? The case of Hungary by Havas, Attila
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does innovation policy policy matter?
The case of Hungary
Attila Havas
2002
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61180/
MPRA Paper No. 61180, posted 8 January 2015 19:45 UTC
Attila Havas
380
>
Does Innovation 
Policy Matter in 
a Transition Country?
The Case of Hungary
Introduction
Having completed the first phase
of its transition, Hungary has again
reached a crossroads. While the one-
party system has been replaced by a multi-
party parliamentary democracy and the
planned economy with a market economy
based on private ownership, the world has
significantly changed during this histori-
cally short period of time. Practically all
of Hungary’s intellectual and material re-
sources have been used to accomplish the
fundamental social and economic trans-
formation process as quickly as possible,
so the focus has been on “burning” issues
like budgetary pressures, current account
and trade imbalances, foreign debts, infla-
tion, privatisation. A number of new polit-
ical and economic institutions required
for long-term development have also been
(re-)introduced. Yet, most efforts have gone
towards solving short-term problems and
thus it has hardly been possible to pay suf-
ficient attention to the emerging global
trends, nor to devise an appropriate strat-
egy to improve Hungary’s long-term com-
petitiveness in these new settings.
Thanks to significantly improved eco-
nomic performance and given the main
European and global developments (e.g.
enlargement of the European Union — EU
— envisioned by 2004, structural changes
in a number of industries), a longer-term
approach is now needed. Hungary has to
consider what role to play in the globalis-
ing learning economy, i.e. what future it
envisions for itself. To be more specific,
does the country passively accept the fate
of a mere surviving economy, drifting
along without having its own strategy? Or,
by implementing a clear strategy, does
Hungary intend to be a prosperous coun-
try in which most citizens enjoy high liv-
ing standards, good health and a clean
environment within 15-20 years?
A sound, coherent innovation policy is
one of the cornerstones of an overall
development strategy that is required if a
country is to excel. Without the co-ordi-
nating framework that a consistent, broad
innovation policy can offer, it is not possi-
ble to use resources in the most efficient
way. Yet in spite of a number of attempts
in the 1990s no such policy document was
approved in Hungary. 
This article follows an evolutionary
economics of innovation framework.1
One of the most important policy impli-
cations of this school is that public poli-
cies should be aimed at promoting learn-
ing in its widest possible sense, in other
words competence-building at individual,
organisational and inter-organisational lev-
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els. Co-operation and networking among a
host of actors, including not only research-
ers and producers but also users is a vital
element in generating and disseminating
knowledge.2 A system-approach is required,
therefore, in policy-making, whereby ‘poli-
cies recognise the division of labour in the
generation of innovation-relevant knowl-
edge, that no individual firm is self-suffi-
cient in its knowledge and skills and that
there are corresponding gains from link-
ing firms with the wider matrix of knowl-
edge-generating institutions’ (Metcalfe
and Georghiou 1998:84). Indeed, a recent
trend in the science and technology (S&T)
policies of advanced countries sees a shift
from direct research and development
(R&D) support to promoting linkages,
communication and co-operation among
the players in the innovation process and
thus building an appropriate organisation-
al and institutional infrastructure.3
Other policies, such as investment, pri-
vatisation, industrial, regional development,
competition, trade, monetary, fiscal, edu-
cation, labour market and foreign poli-
cies, also have certain bearings on innova-
tion and diffusion and should thus be co-
ordinated as well.
One of the underlying postulates of
evolutionary economics is that “history
does matter”. Indeed, the legacy of plan-
ning, and especially of the reformed econ-
omy, still has non-negligible impacts on
the political and consumer “tastes” of
people, workers’ norms, managers’ behav-
iour, as well as policy-makers’ thoughts
(e.g. because of the old dilemma of growth
vs. stability, the burden of foreign debts
since the late 1970s). These experiences,
expectations, attitudes and behavioural
norms — together with the inherited eco-
nomic problems, of course — constitute a
relatively controversial legacy for the tran-
sition process. Hence, they are directly or
indirectly important factors for the inno-
vation process, too. Space limits do not al-
low to discuss them here in detail, but some
of these factors are used at various points
of this article as explanatory variables.4
The article first provides a brief over-
view of the transition process in Hungary,
emphasising the simultaneous need for sys-
temic (institutional) changes and macro-
economic stabilisation in order to improve
(micro-)economic performance. Its core
section analyses recent changes in the S&T
decision-making system, various efforts to
draft S&T and innovation policy docu-
ments, as well as the inputs and outputs of
R&D and innovation. It concludes that
given the strong need for aligned public
and private efforts, the present “implicit”
innovation policy in Hungary cannot pro-
vide appropriate answers to the current
challenges.
Transition Process: Systemic
Changes and Stabilisation
Given the planned economy her-
itage, it was not only the “usual” mac-
roeconomic stabilisation that was
required in Hungary at the begin-
ning of the 1990s but a much more
challenging, more complex moderni-
sation programme introducing fun-
damental structural, institutional
changes. In other words, systemic changes
were required in order to make Hungary a
viable economy. This difficult enough task
was further exacerbated by an additional
socio-psychological factor. Most Hungarian
citizens (like in other transition coun-
tries) associated the economic and socio-
psychological hardship of the 1990s with
the new socio-economic (political) sys-
tem, although the harsh austerity mea-
sures were in fact necessitated by the lega-
cy of the former system.5 Policy-makers
and politicians, therefore, were reluctant
to devise and implement a “textbook-
case” stabilisation programme. They were
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
inclined to “soften” macroeconomic poli-
cies as soon it seemed possible, usually
earlier than was really feasible and reason-
able from a strict economic point of view.
The concomitant “oscillation” in macro-
economic indicators can easily be detect-
ed in Table 1.6
Legal and Institutional
Framework
The first phase of the transition process
in Hungary is now over. The most impor-
tant political and economic institutions
have been re-established, including a par-
liamentary democracy based on a multi-
party system, the private ownership of
assets, free factor and commodity mar-
kets and a stock exchange.7 Some crucial
economic institutions — e.g. a two-tier
banking system, a “Western-type” taxa-
tion system (value-added tax, personal
income tax) — were introduced as early as
1987, that is, preceding the systemic changes.
Most firms and banks were privatised by
the mid-1990s, mainly by foreign investors,
i.e. by genuine owners (as opposed to “arti-
ficial” ones created by various voucher
schemes in other transition countries).
In 1990, the proportion of state own-
ership was over 90 percent in the Hun-
garian economy. By 2000 this had reached
almost the opposite end of the scale with
private ownership representing almost 80
percent. A similar change took place in the
structure of gross domestic product (GDP):
the private sector’s contribution to GDP
was some 25 percent in 1990, increasing to
90 percent by 2000 (TEP 2001:28).
The institutional structure of econom-
ic policy-making and its implementation
have been significantly re-organised. The
independence of the Hungarian National
Bank is guaranteed by law. The state bud-
get has been reorganised into indepen-
dent sub-systems and its deficit is being
funded by the capital market. The financial
sector has been restructured. Competition
has emerged in the commercial banking
and insurance sectors, and a large number
of consulting and brokerage firms have
been established. The Competition Office
is now in operation and extensive reforms
have been introduced in the social securi-
ty system.
A number of important tasks remain,
however, including the achievement of
legal harmonisation with the EU and the
completion of state budget reforms.
Macroeconomic
Performance and
Microeconomic Adjustment
Hungary has inherited a non-viable eco-
nomic system. Most companies became
complacent in the period of the planned
economy: they became accustomed to
enjoying a quasi-monopoly in the domes-
tic market and a huge “hungry” and there-
fore not overly demanding export market
in the CMEA,8 mainly the former Soviet
Union. They could also count on regular
bailouts, whenever it was necessary. The
size distribution of firms was distorted
(lack of small and medium enterprises —
SMEs, the dominance of inflexible, large
firms, which however lacked economies
of scale as they had been created artificial-
ly by merging medium-sized firms located
in different parts of the country). Foreign
trade was mainly conducted with other
CMEA-members. To keep this sinking
boat afloat, i.e. to prevent an open eco-
nomic and political crisis, excessive for-
eign debts had accumulated by the late
1980s. With the collapse of CMEA, prac-
tically all large firms lost their markets
overnight, with their domestic suppliers,
in turn, also collapsing. That was the
“recipe” for the most severe economic cri-
sis in the history of Hungary; its conse-
quences were at least as serious as the
impacts of the Great Depression in 1929-
33. In the first three years of the transition
process more than 1.5 million jobs were
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lost, and the GDP dropped by almost 20
percent (Antal 1998a:57).
After that sharp decline in the early
1990s the Hungarian economy has been
“bouncing back”: falling inflation and un-
employment rates together with acceler-
ating GDP growth have characterised the
last four to five years (see Table 1). GDP
reached the “pre-transition” level, that is,
the level for 1989, by 1999. Economic
growth is almost twice the rate seen in the
EU (2.5 percent and 3.4 percent for the
EU15 in 1999 and 2000, respectively). The
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI)
per capita is the highest of CEEs, although
since 2000 it has been “neck-and-neck”
with the Czech Republic (over USD 2000
per capita, author’s calculation based on
UN ECE 2001:177).
The strict macroeconomic manage-
ment regime since 1995-96 has undeni-
ably contributed to the country’s success-
ful macroeconomic performance. A major
positive trend has been the strong export-
orientation of the industrial sector, large-
ly due to the fact that quite a few Hungarian
firms — especially those in automotive
and electronics components, as well as in
telecom equipment manufacturing sec-
tors — have been re-integrated into inter-
national production networks either as
subsidiaries or independent suppliers to
multinational corporations (MNCs) (Havas
2000b; 2001).
Yet there is still a considerable gap
between two groups of manufacturing
firms. On one hand, large, mostly export-
driven, efficient and profitable foreign-
owned firms, operating high-tech equip-
ment account for the impressive micro-
economic statistics. Most of their local
suppliers — either foreign-owned or do-
mestic — are also successful and have
promising prospects. On the other hand,
a large number of indigenous, mostly
SMEs can be found, usually lacking the
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
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Table 1: Main Economic Indicators, 1990-2000 (Previous Year = 100)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GDP 96.5 88.1 96.9 99.4 102.9 101.5 101.3 104.6 104.9 104.2 105.2b
Exports 95.9 95.1 102.1 89.9 113.7 113.4 107.4 129.9 122.5 115.9 121.7
Imports 94.8 105.5 100.2 120.2 108.8 99.3 105.7 126.4 124.9 114.3 120.8
Consumer price index 128.9 135.0 123.0 122.5 118.8 128.2 123.6 118.3 114.3 110.0 109.8
Trade balance (USD billion) 0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -3.6 -3.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.1 -2.7 -3.0 -4.0
Current account
balance (EUR billion)
0.1 0.2 0.2 -3.0 -3.3 -1.9 -1.3 -0.8 -2.0 -1.9 -1.4
Foreign direct investmentª
(EUR billion)
.. 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.0 3.5 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.5
International reserves 
(year-end, EUR billion)
.. 3.0 3.6 6.0 5.5 9.4 7.8 7.6 8.0 10.9 12.1
Registered unemployed 
(year-end, thousands)
80 406 660 632 520 496 478 464 404 405 372
Budget balance/GDP (percent)
(excluding privatisation proceeds)
0.3 -2.9 -7.0 -5.6 -8.4 -6.8 -3.1 -4.6 -6.3 -3.7 -3.4
Net foreign debt (including 
loans provided by parent firms 11.8 10.9 10.8 13.4 15.4 12.7 11.7 10.7 11.0 11.2 12.2
for subsidiaries, EURbillion)
Notes to Table 1: a Equity capital; b Preliminary data; 
Sources: compiled from annual reports of the Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance and
National Bank of Hungary.
capital for development, applying obso-
lete technologies and thus facing the threat
of bankruptcy or stagnation with an on-
going, tough struggle for survival — at best
a relatively risky future with low growth
potential (TEP 2001).
S&T and Innovation
Reflecting the recent policy ap-
proaches in evolutionary economics
of innovation, Dodgson and Bessant
(1996:4) proposed a clear distinction
between science, technology and
innovation policy. They define science
policy as ‘concerned with the develop-
ment of science and the training of scien-
tists,’ while technology policy ‘has as its
aims the support, enhancement and
development of technology, often with a
military and environmental protection
focus’. Innovation policy, however, takes
into account the complexities of the inno-
vation process, and hence aims to facili-
tate interactions between firms of all sizes
and public and private research institutes
(1996:4-5). These definitions are applied
in the remaining sections of the article.
A number of important legal and or-
ganisational changes have occurred in the
S&T system since the early 1990s, especial-
ly concerning intellectual property rights,
higher education, as well as the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.9 As space limits pre-
vent even a short description of these
changes, this section only discusses the
reorganisation of S&T policy-making bod-
ies, the main policy documents devised in
the last decade and their implementation.
Finally, it highlights an apparent paradox
between the severely cut R&D resources
and the relatively successful innovation
performance.
Reorganised S&T
Government Bodies
The main S&T government bodies were
constantly reorganised throughout the
1990s, but pointing in the same direction.
They strongly suggest that innovation has
not been on the top of the agenda of any
government since 1990. While the OMFB
(Országos Mú´szaki fejlesztési Bizottság
— National Committee for Technological
Development) used to be headed by a
deputy prime minister until 1990, but
since then it has constantly been “demot-
ed” in this respect: in 1990-94 its Pre-
sident was a minister without portfolio, in
1994-99 a secretary of state “supervised”
by another minister, and from January
2000 a deputy secretary of state, as the
OMFB itself was “relegated” from being a
government agency to a division of the
Ministry of Education.
The most worrying consequence of
this latest reorganisation is a key change
in the decision-making system. Until the
end of 1999, strategic issues were decided
on by the OMFB Council. It was a 15-
strong committee appointed by the Prime
Minister consisting of high-ranking rep-
resentatives of six interested ministries
and the research community, as well as
business people and an innovation policy
expert. Given the nature of the innova-
tion process and the concomitant need to
co-ordinate the resources of various min-
istries as well private efforts, this seemed
to be a reasonable organisational frame-
work for making strategic decisions. Since
January 2000, however, the former OMFB
Council is no longer a decision-making
body; it is an advisory board for the Minister
of Education.10
The highest-ranking committee res-
ponsible for science or S&T policy —
known under various names, more recent-
ly as S&T Policy Council — has shared a
somewhat similar fate; its political status
has also been constantly eroded since 1990
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
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(Havas 2001). The failed attempts to ob-
tain government approval for technology
and innovation policy documents, dis-
cussed in the next subsection, as well as
the downward trend in government fund-
ing of R&D (see Table 5) can only rein-
force the above observation.
S&T and Innovation Policy
Documents
Transition has brought about a number
of crucial political and economic changes
affecting the S&T system. A number of
S&T policy documents have also been
drafted. However, up until 2000 no sys-
tematic technology or innovation policies
had been “rubber-stamped” — let alone
carried out — by the government.
In 1995, OMFB drafted a policy docu-
ment entitled “The Government’s Con-
cept for Technical Development”, provid-
ing a vision and listing government tasks
in both the short and long run. The OMFB
Council discussed it and gave its full sup-
port. This document even summarised the
most common arguments levied against a
more pro-active S&T policy, together with
counter-arguments, in an attempt to con-
vince politicians and government officials
that the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and
EU member-countries are not following
an extreme “laissez-faire” ideology. Further
inter-ministerial discussions were blocked
by the Prime Minister’s Office, and hence
the document never reached the cabinet.
In 1996, a “Modernisation Programme”
of the then government coalition was for-
mulated, “recycling” some elements and
ideas from the aforementioned document
(OMFB 1995), but again there was no
political will and support for an innova-
tion policy. Given the drastic stabilisation
programme launched in 1995 there were
no extra funds available to promote R&D
and innovation. In fact, finance for R&D
reached its lowest level ever in these two
years (1995-96). Apparently, policy-mak-
ers can only think of a new policy when
they have additional resources. Most like-
ly, it would be too difficult for them to re-
allocate the same — or shrinking — funds
for new priorities as it would hurt a number
of groups with a strong bargaining position. 
Yet another policy document has been
drafted by OMFB staff by November 1999,
entitled “Innovation Strategy for Com-
petitiveness” (OMFB 1999). Before any
attempt to implement this strategy, the
OMFB was merged with the Ministry of
Education, as already discussed. The new
political leaders who took control of R&D
and innovation policy have simply not con-
sidered that document at all.11 It was print-
ed in December 1999, but its circulation
was stopped in early January 2000.
The government’s latest R&D policy
is set out in a document entitled “Science
and Technology Policy — 2000” (OM
2000). This document was first approved
by the Science and Technology Policy
Council in March 2000, and then con-
firmed by a government decree in August
2000. Despite its title, it is mainly a sci-
ence policy document identifying five
“national R&D programmes” on: 
— improving the quality of life (i.e. biomed-
ical, pharmaceutical and related projects);
— information and communication tech-
nologies;
— environmental and materials research;
— agribusiness and biotechnology; and
— national heritage and contemporary
social challenges.
There are two key shortcomings of this
document. First, it would be hard to find
any experienced researcher who could not
“package” his or her project under the label
of one of these five “national programmes”.
Second, it can be seen as a sharp return to
the “good old” linear model of innovation,
indicating the strength — as well as the way
of thinking — of the “science” lobby. The
systemic, complex nature of innovation,
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
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even the basic concept of demand for inno-
vation, is not considered at all.
Research, development and innova-
tion is one of the seven programmes out-
lined in a recent national development
strategy, the Széchenyi Plan, also launched
in 2000 (GM 2000). Its chapter 4, entitled
“Program for the Support of Research,
Development and Innovation Programme”,
consists of three sub-programmes for: 
— the five national R&D programmes
mentioned above;
— ‘the extension of existing R&D sup-
port schemes and promotion of the R&D
institutional network’; and
— ‘increasing the absorption capacity of
the R&D institutional network’.
As it is not easy to understand even the
Hungarian titles of the latter two sub-pro-
grammes,12 their official translation is used
here.13 Their relatively short explanation —
in either case just a few lines — suggests
that the main aims are to strengthen the
R&D institutes’ capabilities as a pre-requi-
site to conducting the “national R&D pro-
grammes” and increasing the number of
R&D personnel in both the public and pri-
vate sectors. Again, an overriding emphasis
is put on the “supply” side, while quite a
few important players and elements of the
innovation process are eclipsed.
Participants in the first Hungarian Tech-
nology Foresight Programme (TEP —
Technológiai Eló´retekintési Program),
launched in 1997, however, took a broader
analytical framework.14 Their main concern
was to identify major tools to improve the
quality of life and enhance international
competitiveness, and thus they emphasised
the significance of both knowledge genera-
tion and exploitation and the diffusion of
knowledge. It is clearly reflected in all types
of TEP results (Delphi-survey, long-term
visions and policy recommendations), which
will now be briefly discussed in turn.
Statements for a two-round Delphi-
survey15 were formulated by some 200 panel
members of TEP. If anything, the almost
exclusively science and technology-ori-
ented Japanese and British questionnaires
could have possibly affected the panel
members when formulating their state-
ments for the Hungarian Delphi-survey.
Furthermore, most of the panel members
were not policy analysts or social scien-
tists, but research scientists and engineers
or managers. Yet, the number of state-
ments dealing with non-technological
issues exceeded that of S&T ones (177 and
172, respectively).16 Furthermore, half of
the “top 10” Delphi-statements — those
deemed most favourable by the respon-
dents, i.e. with the highest combined
socio-economic and S&T impacts — were
non-technological in their nature. This
result indicates the importance of human
resources, regulation and institutions,
that is, the salient relevance of an innova-
tion system approach in a transition coun-
try. The majority of respondents — most-
ly technical experts (Havas 2000a), and
not social scientists attracted to some
“fluffy” theories on the importance of
networks, co-operation and institutions
etc. — put as much weight on these non-
technological issues than on the techno-
logical ones.
Long-term visions and policy recom-
mendations of the seven panels also turn-
ed out to be formulated in the broader con-
text of innovation. It is also telling that
the Steering Group (SG) grouped its 22 re-
commendations under three main headings: 
— an educated, co-operative, flexible and
healthy population, adaptable to the ever-
changing surroundings, ideas, solutions
and value systems;
— a clean and healthy environment; and
— an appropriate, strong and effective
national system of innovation.
Yet, these recommendations, albeit
broadly shared by the contributors to the
foresight process — either as panel and
SG members, respondents to the Delphi-
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
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survey or participants at more than a hun-
dred workshops — did not have any sig-
nificant effect on the policy framework
before May 2002.17
To sum up, a coherent policy frame-
work for innovation is yet to be developed
in Hungary. To achieve this, it might be
useful to explore why all these attempts
have failed so far. One might argue that
the lack of adequate funds, at least until
1996-1997, has not permitted to devise
and implement “costly” policies. Indeed,
most long-term policies, such as educa-
tion, infrastructure, innovation, industri-
al, SMEs, regional, health care, and envi-
ronmental ones, would require substan-
tial investment projects and/or generous
subsidies. The transition process, howev-
er, has hit Central European countries
hard: they have to cope with significant
budget deficits plus find the means to
tackle more urgent needs such as rocket-
ing unemployment.18 However, money is
always a scarce resource and when a coun-
try is in a particularly difficult situation
there are even more pressing reasons to
devise and implement a sound strategy
(be it innovation or any other strategy). If
policy-makers only focus on “crisis man-
agement”, neglecting the fundamental,
structural factors, then the “roots” of the
problems remain intact, causing more dif-
ficulties in the near future, and hence neces-
sitating yet more “crisis management”. In
the worst case, even vicious circles may
develop, draining all the material and
intellectual resources, i.e. never allowing
the finding of a long-term solution.
From a broader perspective, one might
identify further, somewhat “softer”, yet
more convincing reasons. The former
socio-economic system — especially the
poor economic performance in spite of
the plethora of so-called central develop-
ment programmes in the 1970-80s — dis-
credited government-led efforts in gener-
al, almost regardless of the substance and
quality of such strategies.19 More “abstract”
ideological stands against an apparently
increased role of government were also at
work to abort any overarching innovation
strategy, especially in the early 1990s. More-
over, there have been vested interests
against concerted efforts in Hungary, too,
just as in many other countries: govern-
ment departments and agencies usually
prefer not to share their resources with
each other even if their co-operation could
lead to more efficient public spending.
Further, in the first ten years of transi-
tion there were strong illusions and mis-
conceptions concerning R&D and inno-
vation activities and policies. One of
these was that scientific knowledge would
automatically become technological capa-
bility; hence, no specifically designed
schemes would be needed to facilitate this
process. Also, in the first half of the 1990s
policy-makers apparently did not realise
the link between economic development
and S&T efforts. It may not have been a
deliberate policy. Yet, their (non-)actions
imply that they assumed that R&D
expenditures can be cut without serious
socio-economic consequences. The irony
is that this view was not without its foun-
dations in the specific Hungarian circum-
stances for two reasons. First, given the
poor economic performance during the
planned economy period, the return on
R&D expenditures was a largely neglect-
ed issue on the whole. Second, new tech-
nologies brought in by foreign investors
“in bulk” since the early 1990s indeed
facilitated rapid industrial re-structuring
and market re-orientation without much
local R&D input.20
There is a big policy problem with this
view, however. Economic development can
indeed be maintained, or even accelerat-
ed, without indigenous R&D and innova-
tion efforts in the short run thanks to
FDI. Yet, a country opting for this “devel-
opment” path becomes not only overly
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
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dependent on foreign technologies but
would most likely also lose its attractive-
ness: at best becoming the “dumping site”
of outdated technologies, or even aban-
doned by foreign manufacturing firms
altogether. From a different angle, this
way of thinking clearly cuts innovation
from R&D, considering the latter one to
be a luxury, or a privilege for a narrow
elite, ignoring the abundant evidence
accumulated by the economics of innova-
tion and all the policy implications (Ergas
1987; Levin et al. 1987; OECD 1992; 1997;
1998; 1999; 2000; 2001a; Nelson 1993; EC
1996; Freeman and Soete 1997; Lundvall
and Borrás 1999).
Implementation
As for science policy, it has been
implemented through the annual govern-
ment grant to the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences (HAS) and its subsequent alloca-
tion among the HAS institutes and the
Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA
— Országos Tudományos Kutatási Alap-
programok).21 Hungarian scientists can also
apply for government-funded grants to
finance their research activities in Hungary
for a four-year period22 or abroad (usually
for a few months). Funding through the
new “national R&D programmes” started
in 2001, and is administered by a newly
established Programme Office. The Higher
Education Development Programmes
(FEFA — Felsó´oktatási Fejlesztési Alap-
programok) can also be regarded as an
indirect science policy tool.23
Technology policy schemes, on the
other hand, used to be devised and admin-
istered by the OMFB until 1999. Schemes
were revised annually, and approved by
the OMFB Council, as were the funds
earmarked for them. Since January 2000,
when the OMFB was taken over by the
Ministry of Education, the Minister has
taken these decisions.
Firms, universities and other R&D units
can apply for favourable loans or grants
under these schemes. Some are aimed at
supporting certain technologies, while
others can be regarded as innovation poli-
cy tools (following the definition of
Dodgson and Bessant 1996). The former
ones are listed below (as of 2000-2001):24
— information and communication tech-
nologies;
— biotechnology; and
— environmental technologies.
Some schemes have been specifically
designed with a systemic approach in
mind, i.e. to facilitate network building,
communication and co-operation among
various players of the national innovation
system. Hence, these can be regarded as
implicit innovation policy tools. Their
main characteristics are described below.25
The Co-operative Research Centre
(CRC) scheme was launched in 1999 to
foster strategic, long-term co-operation
between higher education institutions,
other non-profit R&D units and busi-
nesses, by establishing CRCs. The overall
goal, on one hand, is to promote innova-
tion and competitiveness and, on the
other, to “inject” practical, business con-
siderations into research carried out at
higher education institutes, and indirectly
to also enrich the curricula with these
aspects. It is needless to stress that both
are crucial in Hungary.
The “Integrator” programme is another
important “innovation-minded” scheme,
designed to support inter-firm co-opera-
tion. This scheme was initiated by large
companies in early 1999, and launched
already in the same year. Its main aim is to
improve Hungarian SMEs’ innovative capa-
bilities and competitiveness, promote their
networking activities to conduct techno-
logical development projects and, as a
result, to help them becoming suppliers of
large firms. Large firms and their poten-
tial suppliers can only apply jointly, as a
consortium.
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Yet another set of schemes is aimed at
developing the physical and institutional
infrastructure of R&D and innovation,
and hence it would hardly be possible to
classify them as “pure” technology or in-
novation policy tools. In other words,
their likely impact is twofold: enhanced
development of certain technologies (pro-
ducts, processes) but in the meantime more
intense and deeper interactions among
the players of national and international
innovation systems, as their objectives,
summarised in Table 2, reveal.
R&D and Innovation
Performance: An Apparent
Paradox
Available data suggest an apparent
paradox between the declining R&D
activities (more specifically R&D inputs)
and the strong, successful innovation per-
formance. A closer look, however, reveals
that it is a somewhat deceiving paradox as
the strong innovation performance is
mainly due to FDI, other forms of tech-
nology acquisition, as well as local innova-
tive but not formal R&D activities.
R&D expenditures have dropped sig-
nificantly since the late 1980s. Whereas
2.3 percent of GDP had been devoted to
R&D in 1988, this ratio fell to 0.7 percent
by 1996 and has remained at that level
until 1999.26 Given that GDP only reached
its 1989 level in 1999, it is indeed a dra-
matic drop (see Table 3). To compare, EU
countries on average spend around 1.8-2
percent of their GDP on R&D.27 This is
already a huge difference, moreover, their
GDP per capita is three times higher than
the figure for Hungary.
In 2000 the Hungarian government
declared that gross domestic expenditure
on research and experimental development
(GERD) should reach 1.5 percent of GDP
by 2002. A number of experts had doubts,
however, about the feasibility of this goal.
Their two main reservations were whether
this pledge would be fulfilled at all, and if
yes, whether R&D expenditures could be
possibly doubled in an efficient way within
the space of two years. Preliminary data jus-
tify this scepticism: GERD remained well
below the target, reaching only 0.94 per-
cent of GDP in 2001.
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Table 2: Further Schemes Funded by the CentralTechnological Development Fund (1999-2001)
Scheme Objectives of scheme
Applied R&D Programme
Fostering the development of new products, services and 
processes
Competitive Product Programme Improving the competitiveness of existing products by R&D
"Maecenas" Programme
Supporting participation at, or organisation of, conferences,
paying membership fees in international S&T organisations
Regional Innovation Programme
Promoting R&D by SMEs through projects devised by 
county Chambers of Commerce or their consortia
Special Innovation Programme for three counties Improving the innovation skills of SMEs in "cohesion" areas
TECH-START Programme Promoting the growth of innovative SMEs
Liaison Office Programme Assisting Hungarian participation in the EU 5th RTD FP
Consortium Building Programme Assisting Hungarian participation in the EU 5th RTD FP
Participation in the NATO (North Atlantic 
Fostering international S&T co-operation
Treaty Organization) Science Programme
Private Investment in Applied R&D
Fostering private investment in R&D (extending existing
R&D units or establishing new ones, and thereby creating
new R&D jobs in the business sector)
Source: author’s compilation from OMFB documents launching the various technology policy schemes.
Inevitably, R&D personnel were also
cut drastically up until 1995, by 56.5 per-
cent compared to 1988.28 Since then, a
slight increase can be observed. Yet, the
2000 total is still 47.8 percent lower than
the 1988 one (see Table 4). In some cases,
this cut involved necessary streamlining.
In others, it implied a serious loss of use-
ful knowledge (including tacit knowl-
edge)29 and skills developed and accumu-
lated over time. Clearly, it would not be
possible to reproduce these intangible as-
sets immediately when funds are increased.
No reliable estimates are readily available
on the share of necessary streamlining
and severe loss. Furthermore, the compo-
sition of total R&D personnel has also
changed: as opposed to the late 1980s the
number of researchers and engineers has
exceeded that of the supporting staff. In
some cases, this is a step towards increased
efficiency but in others it causes ineffi-
ciency at a social level. When the lack of
supporting staff forces highly qualified
scientists to perform simple tasks, instead
of solving scientific problems, which is
what they are trained for, that is obviously
a waste of expensive resources.
Given the underlying principles of a
market economy, some observers and politi-
cians expected firms to play a decisive role
in financing and executing R&D and, in
turn, the government’s share to fall. Quite
the opposite shift occurred in 1990-94. In
fact, it is not even surprising if one takes into
account the broader economic trends.
In the early 1990s most Hungarian
companies were suffering from the loss of
markets for two principal reasons, namely
the collapse of the CMEA, their former
major market, and the swift import liber-
alisation. Hence, their sales declined dra-
matically (by up to 75 percent in some
industries) compared to the last pre-tran-
sition years of 1988-89. Shrinking revenues
then prevented them from generating
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Table 3: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD), 1990-2000, Current Prices
GERD 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Forints, billion 33.3 26.7 31.0 34.7 38.9 41.2 44.9 61.7 68.6 78.2 105.4
GERD/GDP (%) 1.46 1.06 1.04 0.97 0.88 0.73 0.65 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.82
GERD per capita* 123.3 79.1 81.0 78.0 74.0 66.5 60.7 71.0 71.1 77.1 n.a.
Note to Table 3: * current USD at purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Source: OECD Main S&T Indicators
Table 4: R&D Personnel in Hungary, 1988-2000, Full-time Equivalent
1988 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total R&D personnel 45,069 24,192 19,585 19,776 20,758 20,315 21,329 23,534
of whom scientists and engineers 21,427 12,311 10,499 10,408 11,154 11,731 12,579 14,406
Other staff* 23,642 11,881 9,086 9,268 9,604 8,584 8,750 9,128
Note to Table 4: * Includes technicians, assistants, administrators etc.
Source: Research and Development (CSO), various years.
Table 5: Breakdown of GERD by Sources, 1990-2000, Percent
Funding sources 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Business 38.8 40.3 31.3 28.6 28.7 36.1 37.4 36.4 37.8 38.5 37.8
Government 58.6 55.8 62.9 65.1 63.0 55.1 51.2 54.8 54.7 53.2 49.5
Other domestic 2.1 2.9 3.9 4.7 4.1 6.9 4.6 2.8 2.7 2.1
Foreign, int’l 1.8 2.9 2.4 3.6 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.7 5.6 10.6
Source: Research and Development (CSO), various years.
adequate funds for R&D (see Table 5) and
investment. Another element of the ex-
planation is that privatisation only started
in 1990 and it always takes time to find
investors. In that period, however, man-
agers were not in the position to make
decisions on long-term issues, including
R&D and innovation, for two reasons. First,
it would have been somewhat hostile to
the would-be owners to tie their hands,
which, in turn, would have made the rela-
tionship between the (prospective) own-
ers and managers uneasy. Not surprisingly,
managers did not want to cause this type
of conflict. Second, managers were over-
whelmed by the preparations for privati-
sation (which included restructuring and
cost-cutting), i.e. by short-term issues. In
brief, uncertainties related to the prospec-
tive privatisation of companies also hin-
dered R&D until the mid-1990s.
Then the share of business R&D ex-
penditures in GERD jumped almost 8 per-
centage points in 1995, and thereafter it has
remained at around 38 percent (see Table 5).
Significant differences among companies
should also be noted. Foreign-owned firms
do spend more on R&D than domestic ones.
The share of foreign affiliates in Hungarian
BERD (business enterprise expenditure on
R&D) grew from 22.6 percent in 1994 to 78.5
percent in 1998 (OECD 2001b). Moreover,
foreign-owned firms can also rely on the
R&D results achieved or purchased by their
parent company.
Obviously, the share of government
R&D expenditures changed in the oppo-
site direction in the meantime, and by
2000 it had dropped below 50 percent. An
important factor to account for this change
is the fact that funding from international
sources significantly increased in 1999-2000
(see Table 5), notably from the 5th Re-
search, Technological Development and
Demonstration (RTD) Framework Pro-
gramme of the EU.
Given the drastic microeconomic
adjustment in the early 1990s, the number
of R&D units operated by firms first
sharply decreased, and has then risen con-
siderably after the mid-1990s.30 A number
of large, foreign-owned firms have either
substantially increased R&D spending at
their existing R&D units or set up new
R&D facilities, especially since 1997-98.
The expanding number of R&D units
in higher education is also worth noting
(see Table 6).
A simple analysis of the distribution of
researchers by sector corroborates the
above observations (see Tables 7 and 8).
The total number of researchers was still
slightly below the 1991 level in 2000 (0.4
percent lower), but there was almost 40
percent growth in the 1996-2000 period.
The higher education sector was a clear
winner with nearly a 20 percent increase
in absolute numbers by 2000 compared
to 1991, and a massive 51.7 percent expan-
sion since its lowest level in 1996. Thus,
the share of this sector also grew from 34
percent in 1991 to above 40 percent in
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Table 6: Number of R&D Units, 1990-2000
Type of organisations 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Research institutes 69 68 68 68 63 61 73 80 74 66 121
Higher education 940 1,000 1,071 1,078 1,106 1,109 1,120 1,302 1,335 1,363 1,421
Firms 174 124 98 178 183 226 220 246 258 394 478
Other* 73 65 50 56 49 46 48 51 58 64 -
Total 1256 1,257 1,287 1,380 1,401 1,442 1,461 1,679 1,725 1,887 2,020 
Note to Table 6: * Includes R&D units operated at national and regional archives, libraries, muse-
ums, hospitals and ministries; since 2000 reported as part of Research Institutes.
Sources: Research and Development (CSO), various years.
2000. The government sector was the
most stable one, losing less than 7 percent
in absolute numbers in 1991-1996, but gain-
ing almost 11 percent in 1991-2000, and
slightly above three percentage points in
terms of its weight throughout the decade.
Although the business sector also showed
spectacular growth (close to 50 percent)
in absolute numbers in 1996-2000, it con-
tracted by the same extent in the first six
years and hence lost over a quarter of its
researchers when 2000 is compared to 1991.
Its share, therefore, dropped by almost 10
percentage points by 2000, which does
not seem to be a favourable development
from the aspect of innovation. Thus, a
recent scheme aimed at encouraging pri-
vate investment in R&D (see Table 2) is
indeed addressing a crucial issue.
Regarding the output of R&D, the
number of patents registered in the United
States is frequently used as a reliable and
comparable indicator.31 Several former CEE
states were split in the 1990s, therefore,
to preserve data for comparison, figures
for former Czechoslovakia and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) are
also included.
Table 9 shows interesting trends and
ratios. In 1989 two countries performed
relatively well: the USSR and Hungary.
Besides the turmoil of transition, this pic-
ture has remained practically the same
throughout the 1990s. If the size of coun-
tries is also considered, two Central
European countries can be highlighted:
Hungary and Slovenia.32 Slovenia, howev-
er, spends considerably more on R&D
than Hungary: roughly three times more
per capita every single year since 1994 (e.g.
in 1999 240 and 78 current USD — at
Purchasing Power Parity — respectively).
Although business R&D expenditures
have picked up since 1996-97, firms do
not spend a lot on R&D. However, fierce
competition, in both export markets and
the open, liberalised domestic one, com-
pels them to innovate. Indeed, they intro-
duce new products and/or processes, oth-
erwise they would not have survived, but
in most cases these innovations are not
based on domestic R&D projects. Quite
often they rely on technologies provided
by parent companies or other foreign
partners, e.g. under a subcontracting agre-
ement. Foreign firms are also encouraging
their Hungarian suppliers to introduce new
managerial techniques and other organi-
sational innovations.33 Joining the interna-
tional production networks, especially in
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Table 7: Number of Researchers by Sector, 1991-2000, Full-time Equivalent
1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Business enterprises 5,341 2,926 2,626 3,049 3,044 3,261 3,901
Government 4,204 3,529 3,925 3,911 4,289 4,550 4,653
Higher education 4,926 4,044 3,857 4,194 4,398 4,768 5,852
Total 14,471 10,499 10,408 11,154 11,731 12,579 14,406
Sources: Research and Development (CSO), various years.
Table 8: Trends in the Distribution of Researchers by Sector, 1991-2000, Percent
share in share in percentage percentage percentage
1991 2000 change 1996/91 change 2000/91 change 2000/96
Business enterprises 36.9 27.1 49.2 73.0 148.6
Government 29.1 32.3 93.4 110.7 118.6
Higher education 34.0 40.6 78.3 118.8 151.7
Total 100.0 100.0 71.9 99.6 138.4
Sources: author’s calculations, based on Research and Development (CSO), various years.
electronics and automotive industries, has
also opened up the gates of the global
markets for Hungarian firms. Domestic
innovative activities outside the domain
of formal R&D do play an important role,
too, e.g. engineering and re-designing to
adjust to local needs and production facil-
ities, as well as upgrading production
equipment and tooling up to increase effi-
ciency and/or to introduce new products
and processes.
The harmonised OECD-EU innova-
tion survey (CIS — Community In-
novation Survey) has not been conducted
in Hungary yet, and thus data on innova-
tion activities are unavailable. An indirect
method, however, provides straightfor-
ward results. Trade data show a radical
restructuring both in terms of the main
export markets — a swift move towards
the overriding share of the EU (see Table
10) — and in the composition of exported
goods, namely, a move towards higher
value-added products. Meat and semi-fin-
ished products had been “dethroned” by
telecom equipment, electric, energy gen-
eration and office machinery by 2001 (see
Table 11). This remarkable performance in
such competitive markets could have not
been achieved without strong innovation
performance.
It should also be added that the pres-
sure to innovate is eventually leading to
more intense formal R&D activities. The
first clear sign of this is that FDI has sig-
nificantly contributed to strengthening
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Table 9: Central European and Russian “Utility Patents” Granted in the USA, 1963-2000
pre 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1990 total
1987 - 2000
Croatia - - - - - - 0 2 1 6 4 4 13 16 6 52 52
Czech Rep. - - - - - - - 0 1 1 5 14 13 24 23 81 81
Hungary 1469 127 94 129 93 85 88 61 46 50 43 25 50 39 36 616 2435
Poland 537 13 8 14 17 8 5 8 8 8 15 11 15 19 13 127 699
Slovak Rep. - - - - - - -. - 0 0 1 3 2 5 4 15 15
Slovenia - - - - - - 0 3 6 4 10 7 18 10 16 74 74
Russian Fed. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 38 98 116 111 189 181 183 919 919
USSR 6037 121 96 161 174 178 66 65 53 12 16 4 6 3 1 578 6993
Czechoslovakia 1847 46 33 34 39 27 17 13 19 15 8 9 9 5 9 170 2130
Notes to Table 9: Patent origin is determined by the residence of the first-named inventor as dis-
played on the face of each patent. The USPTO definition of ‘Utility Patent’: Issued for the invention
of a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful
improvement thereof, it generally permits its owner to exclude others from making, using, or sell-
ing the invention for a period of up to twenty years from the date of patent application filing, sub-
ject to the payment of maintenance fees. Approximately 90 percent of the patent documents issued by
the USPTO in recent years have been utility patents, also referred to as ‘patents for invention’.
Design, plant and reissue patents are not included in this count. The mark “-” means not applicable
(the country did not exist).
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Table 10: Share of the EU/EC Countries in Hungary’s Foreign Trade (Percent)
1989 1994 1999 2000 2001
Exports 24.8 51.0 76.5 75.1 74.2
Imports 29.0 45.0 64.0 58.4 57.8
Sources: Central Statistical Office (1989-1999), Ministry of Economic Affairs (2000-01).
the formerly relatively weak and ad hoc
business-academia links. In other words,
foreign firms have increasingly realised that
their competitive performance can be main-
tained more easily if they rely not only on
their home R&D labs, but also on the
knowledge of Hungarian researchers, eit-
her by hiring them34 or co-operating with
university departments and R&D insti-
tutes.
Policies should facilitate process, i.e.
the “re-coupling” of domestic R&D and
innovation for a number of reasons. First,
exporting local firms, without maintain-
ing a strong innovation performance, are
likely to lose their markets in the medi-
um-term. Of course, they can rely on the
R&D results of their foreign partners in
the future, too — as they tend to do now
— but pursuing this strategy would result
in a weakening position vis-à-vis their for-
eign partners. At best, it can only be a
strategy for stagnation, but their foreign
partners might opt for other partners in
other countries (with lower production
costs), unless the Hungarian suppliers
improve their own innovative capabili-
ties, i.e. offer something for a new, long-
term partnership. There are other sources
of innovation, too, e.g. in-house, non-R&D
activities or R&D results of local universi-
ty departments and other research units.
Yet, an important outcome of in-house
R&D activities is to acquire knowledge
about developments at the technological
frontier (by following others’ activities,
reproducing their experiments, etc.), and
thus to learn what to adapt and improve
adaptive, innovative capabilities (Levin et
al. 1987). Without conducting some in-
hose R&D activities, these types of know-
ledge, capabilities and skills cannot be ac-
cumulated, and hence less efficient deci-
sions can be made as to what technologies
should be acquired, and the necessary
adaptation would also be slower and more
costly.
The second challenge is the low share
of foreign-owned exporting firms con-
ducting R&D in Hungary. Only 23 of the
top 100 exporting companies conducted
R&D activities in Hungary in 1999, of
which 14 were owned by foreign investors.
However, altogether 63 of the top 100
exporting firms were foreign-owned. This
means that — in terms of numbers — only
22 per cent of the large, foreign-owned,
exporting companies carry out R&D
activities in Hungary (TEP 2001). Again,
without a more intense link with the local
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Table 11: Share of the Top 10 Commodity Groups in Hungarian Exports (1990, 2001)
1990 2001
Commodity groups Share (percent) Commodity groups Share (percent)
Meat products 10.1 Telecommunications equipment 12.6
Chemical semi-finished products 8.6 Electric machinery and components 11.9
Steel semi-finished products 7.1 Energy generation machinery 10.7
Clothing 6.8 Vehicles 8.9
Vehicles 4.8 Office machinery 8.3
Metallurgical raw materials 4.2 Clothing 4.4
Canned fruits and vegetables 3.3 Other processed products 2.9
Chemical raw materials 3.2 General machinery 2.9
Metal semi-finished products 2.3 Metal products 2.2
Pharmaceuticals 1.7 Meat and meat products 2.2
Total 52.1 Total 67.1
Sources: Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbook, 1990 and Press Release on Foreign Trade, January-December
2001, preliminary data, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 February 2002.
R&D system, they might find other loca-
tions with lower production costs even in
the space of a few years, and relocate their
activities.35 Thus, both jobs and export
revenues would be lost, causing macro-
economic and social tensions. One way to
“anchor” them is to provide appropriate
incentives to set up their own, in-house
R&D activities — employing Hungarian
scientists and research engineers — and/or
foster their links with local R&D units.
Conclusions
The political and economic tran-
sition posed a complex, tremendous
challenge in Hungary at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Not only macroeco-
nomic stabilisation was required, but fun-
damental organisational and institutional
changes were also needed to transform
the country into a stable, middle-income
economy, capable of catching up with the
more advanced ones in the longer run.
Science, technology and innovation
policies are no doubt the cornerstones of
any successful catching up strategy as, for
example, the case of the East Asian “tigers”
clearly shows (Hobday 1995). Yet, in the
current Hungarian context it also means
that a number of Herculean tasks have to
be performed at the same time, each being
demanding not only from a financial point
of view, but also politically and intellectu-
ally. These issues, then, compete for the at-
tention of politicians and policy-makers
as well as public funds.
Faced with all these challenges, not
surprisingly, Hungary’s performance has
been mixed. The crucial institutions of a
market economy have been put in place
relatively quickly and after some hesita-
tion a successful, but — largely due to the
delay involved — harsh macroeconomic
stabilisation programme has also been
implemented. Some important legislative
changes have occurred in the field of higher
education and intellectual property rights,
too. Government S&T bodies, however,
seemed to lose their political clout through-
out the 1990s. As for policy, although
R&D expenditures and staff were severe-
ly cut up to 1995-96, the science commu-
nity has always exerted some influence on
public policies. As an unmistakable sign
of this, the government has recently ap-
proved an ambitious science policy docu-
ment that shifts the structure of overall
R&D spending towards “basic science”-
type projects. Technology policy schemes
have also been substantially renewed
since the early 1990s, and “hidden” among
these tools, some elements of innovation
policy have gradually been introduced, es-
pecially since the late 1990s.
Yet, attempts to devise and implement
a coherent set of policies to strengthen the
innovation system “consistently” failed
throughout the 1990s, regardless of the
political stance of the actual governments
in office. Pressures stemming from macro-
economic imbalances requiring immedi-
ate actions, intellectual and financial re-
sources, the socio-psychological legacy of
central planning as well as illusions and
policy misconceptions all contributed to
this. As a clear indication of policy-mak-
ers’ (lack of) interest in innovation, the
harmonised OECD-EU innovation survey
has not yet been conducted in Hungary
(as opposed to Poland and Slovenia, to
mention other EU candidate-countries).
Therefore, innovation efforts and their
outputs cannot be measured. It is also
telling that only a tiny research communi-
ty works on issues relating to science,
technology and innovation; there is sim-
ply no demand for thorough, regular poli-
cy analysis. The lack of data and reliable
analysis on innovation performance, how-
ever, poses a significant threat: policies
are more likely to be influenced by pres-
sure groups and short-term political con-
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siderations than by a sound understand-
ing of the impacts of foregoing decisions
and current (as well as foreseeable future)
socio-economic needs.
An even more worrying possibility is
that the lack of explicit innovation policy
may hinder long-term development. Evo-
lutionary economics of innovation clearly
shows that policies aimed at improving
learning capabilities, facilitating institu-
tion and network building, as well as com-
munication and co-operation among the
key players are of crucial significance. Con-
certed efforts, both public-private part-
nership and co-operation among com-
partmentalised government agencies, are
further keys to success. Here lies the
importance of a thoroughly devised inno-
vation strategy: via explicitly targeting
networking and communication it can
contribute to creating the preconditions
for co-operation and to channel financial
and intellectual resources to achieve the
jointly set goals. In other words, it can sig-
nal the main policy directions and com-
mitments of the government. Further, it
provides an appropriate framework to
understand that enhancing competitive-
ness and improving the quality of life is a
complex task. It requires various types of
efforts and factors, among others, educa-
tion and life-long learning, research and
development, appropriate legal, organisa-
tional, knowledge and physical infrastruc-
tures, institutions to facilitate close co-
operation among the key players, and
these inputs can be used more efficiently
in a co-ordinated way. The lack of such a
strategy, in turn, is indeed a major concern.
Yet, one can “detect” the emergence of
an implicit innovation policy in Hungary
when taking a closer look at the technolo-
gy policy tools administered by the R&D
Division of the Ministry of Education.
There is a severe shortcoming, however.
These are, by definition, schemes of a sin-
gle government body. They cannot be mis-
taken for the tools of a concerted, overar-
ching innovation policy approved by the
government as a whole, and thus “mobilis-
ing” the resources of various government
departments into the same, jointly dis-
cussed and agreed direction.
Beyond the lack of an explicit innova-
tion policy, the recent “relegation” of the
OMFB, the formerly (semi-)independent
government agency, signals an even wors-
ening situation. The former Council of
the OMFB, consisted of high-ranking
officials of interested ministries, repre-
sentatives of the research and business
communities, was a decision-making body.
It was, therefore, an important forum for
co-ordinating the research, technological
development and innovation-related ef-
forts of various government departments.
Since January 2000 this is no longer the
case as this body has been stripped of its
decision-making rights. Nor can it serve
as an influential communication channel
between policy-makers, researchers, busi-
ness people and innovation experts as its
“demotion” has obviously led to shrinking
prestige.
The theoretical arguments of evolu-
tionary economics of innovation, togeth-
er with the lessons of successful “catch-
ing-up” economies, all point to the impor-
tance of an explicit innovation policy to
improve economic performance, and thus
for providing the means for a higher stan-
dard of living. Hungary’s case has so far
shown that a country can escape the im-
mediate consequences of not having one,
but most likely only for a limited period,
and given some lucky coincidences. The
direct disadvantages can, at least partially,
be rectified by a fortunate set of factors and
these have all been present in Hungary: 
— an extreme inflow of FDI, bringing in
technological, organisational and manager-
ial innovations in bulk, more recently also
organising suppliers’ networks and strength-
ening academia-industry links;
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
396
Attila
Havas
Journal of International Relations and Development 5(December 2002)4
397
Does
Innovation
Policy
Matter in a
Transition
Country? 
The Case of
Hungary
— coupled with a previously strong, albeit
severely hit, R&D system, which, relying
on both its previous strengths and the cur-
rent radical restructuring, is still churning
out useful research results as well as skills
required by multinational firms; and
— helped by a systematic technology pol-
icy, assisted by elements of an implicit
innovation policy (e.g. the CRC and In-
tegrator schemes, as discussed in the sub-
section on “Implementation”).
By definition, the long-term drawbacks
cannot be felt immediately. The above,
currently favourable set of factors, how-
ever, are unlikely to hold without systemic,
thoroughly devised efforts, and thus the
temporary positive outcomes may be lost.
This is a one-off, “shaky” situation, in-
deed. Foreign firms can move easily when-
ever they find more attractive locations.
They can close down their plants entirely,
or leave only their obsolete technologies
and low-wage, simple tasks in Hungary.
That would spell a fatal blow not only to
the still fragile R&D system, but also to
their suppliers and then hardly any appli-
cants would survive to make use of tech-
nology policy schemes, regardless of their
sophistication.
By reshaping and considerably streng-
thening the national innovation system,
building the appropriate supporting know-
ledge and physical infrastructures the cur-
rent, temporary advantages can be con-
verted into lasting ones. And these are
precisely the tasks of an explicit innova-
tion policy. For example, stronger co-oper-
ations among firms, as well as between
firms and R&D institutes are advanta-
geous for all parties (as shown by a vast
body of literature, e.g. Ergas 1987; Nelson
1993; Dodgson and Bessant 1996; Edquist
1997; Freeman and Soete 1997; OECD
1997; 1999; 2001a; Lundvall and Borrás
1999). Further, operations of the “enlight-
ened” foreign firms, i.e. those interested in
building long-term, mutually beneficial
relationships in Hungary, as opposed to
exploiting short-term cost advantages,
can be “anchored” by, among other tools,
fostering the emergence of knowledge-
intensive services. Their favourable impacts
on the Hungarian economy can thus be
strengthened and maintained.
To sum up, an explicit innovation poli-
cy is perhaps even more needed in a tran-
sition country, where most of the previous
organisations have to be radically reshaped,
new ones established, communication and
co-operation strengthened etc., than in an
advanced country. The Hungarian case also
offers a bitter and sobering lesson: the
likely positive impacts of an explicit inno-
vation policy are indirect, occur through
many “transmissions”, and mostly in the
medium or even long run. It is, therefore,
a rather demanding task to account for
the outcomes of these efforts, whereas
the lack of them can be eclipsed by the
results of some favourable, albeit tempo-
rary, conditions. Politicians, by contrast,
usually apply a much shorter time horizon
to their decisions. For these reasons, it is
very difficult to convince them that they
should instruct policy-makers to devise
and implement a coherent, overarching in-
novation policy. This then becomes almost
impossible when decision-makers (both
politicians and policy-makers) are work-
ing under the tremendous pressures of
transition and trying to solve immediate
problems.
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